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I have often said, and oftener think, that this world is a comedy to those 
that think, a tragedy to those that feel – a solution of why Democritus 
laughed and Heraclitus wept. 
Horace Walpole, letter to Sir Horace Mann, 31 December 1769. 
 
1. Different things may be meant by ‘theory of tragedy’. One species of 
theory sets itself the task of defining and illuminating tragedy conceived 
as a specific kind of dramatic, literary or cultural object, marking its dis-
tinctions from other literary genres, charting its historical development, 
determining its cultural significance, and so forth. Such theorising takes 
tragedy ab initio as a phenomenon embedded in a historical, literary, or 
cultural context, ranged alongside other kinds of literary work, public 
performance and cultural practice. A different kind of theory of tragedy, 
which we may call ‘internal’, attempts instead to pursue the experience of 
tragedy in the manner of a self-reflection, extending the subject’s aesthet-
ic experience of tragic works of art into the realm of discursive, syste-
matic thought.1 To the extent that tragedy is thought to contain or to 
give expression, if only in incipient form, to a distinctive view of human 
existence or characterisation in the most general terms of the fate of 
human beings, internal theories of tragedy are bound by their very nature 
to be philosophical or at least of philosophical significance  at some 
point in the reflective elaboration of the experience of tragedy, it can be 
expected that contact will be made with themes central to the philosoph-
ical tradition. 
                                     
1 There is a close but complex relation, which cannot be examined here, between 
this reflection, which is that of the spectator, and the perspective of the tragic 
protagonist within the work; an internal theory of tragedy may also be regarded 
as elaborating reflectively the latter. 
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 The two species of theory of tragedy are not, of course, exclusive, 
and it is arguable that a theory of the second sort cannot expect to get 
far, or to convince, if it is not informed by the first, as is the case in 
Nietzsche’s Die Geburt der Tragödie, where an internal theory of tragedy is 
developed in parallel with a theory of tragedy’s historical origins. But the 
two aims  of, on the one hand, determining tragedy’s place in the hu-
man world at large, and on the other, determining the world in its light  
are nonetheless distinct in principle, and the history of philosophy pro-
vides many examples of attempts to grasp the meaning of tragedy in ab-
straction from literary history and cultural context, as indeed ought to be 
possible, if the tragic characterisation of human existence has the strict 
universality which it claims for itself. 
 My concern here is with the question of whether a theory of trage-
dy in the internal sense can hope to succeed. This meta-question may 
sound unduly abstract, and in any case it may be thought that, if we wish 
to pursue it, then we cannot do better than to actually offer an internal 
theory of tragedy, or to examine critically those that have appeared in the 
history of philosophy. I will focus my discussion on two historical fig-
ures, Nietzsche and Sartre, but I do so because they are, I will argue, es-
pecially helpful in allowing us to determine the reasons why it may be 
thought, in general, that an internal theory of tragedy cannot succeed. 
What lends this issue urgency is the close involvement of the question of 
the possibility of an internal theory of tragedy with broader issues which 
are of the highest philosophical and existential importance. If tragedy af-
fords the deepest, or merely one of the deepest, representations of our 
condition, and if the sense of tragic representation cannot be recuperated 
in reflection and command assent, then we are faced immediately with a 
choice of either confessing that discursive thought is incapable of ex-
pressing the most existentially fundamental truths about human exis-
tence, or, alternatively, of devaluing the experience of tragedy. This latter 
may involve shrinking our understanding of the import of tragedy to a 
merely psychological matter, stripped of any claim to truth, reducing the 
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experience of tragedy to a mere affective state, or, if the tragic image of 
human life is allowed to possess truth, this may be construed as concern-
ing merely the plain empirical character of human life, the familiar pre-
ponderance of pain over pleasure in the balance sheet of human expe-
rience. Tragedy would then amount to literary shorthand for a complex 
of independently verifiable generalisations about the ubiquity of suffer-
ing in human life, endowed with the power to affect us emotionally. 
 Devaluation is the route recommended by the modern naturalistic 
orientation, and it is implicit in much discussion of tragedy in the analytic 
philosophical tradition, which focuses on the hedonic paradox in the ex-
perience of tragic works  the question of how pleasure can be derived 
from the representation of pain  in place of a cognitive consideration 
of tragedy. If, however, we hold fast to the conviction that the depth of 
tragedy is a matter of, or that it presupposes, its truth-content, and so re-
ject this devaluation, yet fail to find a convincing systematic, discursive 
conception of the human situation which accords with the sense of hu-
man existence derived from tragedy, then the final, problematic result 
will be that we are divided and conflicted, in a philosophical as well as 
psychological sense. It is not my claim that this is where we are left ulti-
mately, but it seems to me that a strong case can be made in favour of 
such a conclusion. The point of this paper is to explore the reasons for 
pessimism regarding the possibility of an internal theory of tragedy, with 
a view to gaining a clearer picture of our situation. 
 
2. The dominant motive in the formation of theories of tragedy until an 
extremely late historical point was undoubtedly the concern to bring tra-
gedy into accord with morality, and this, I suggest, comprises the chief 
characteristic limitation of historical writing on tragedy, as this appears 
from our late modern, post-Nietzschean point of view. The neo-classical 
tradition, from Horace to Mendelssohn and Lessing, is preoccupied con-
sistently with discovering in tragedy the representation of moral truth 
and/or a medium of moral development. The tenacity of this conviction 
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is witnessed by Schiller’s adaptation of Kant’s theory of the sublime, a 
late and highly sophisticated instance of the attempt to identify a moral 
meaning in tragedy, which nevertheless lacks, for us, the ring of truth  
though we may accept that a connection subsists of tragedy with morali-
ty, the suggestion that the value which tragedy allows to be perceived in 
human life can be identified with or derives from moral commitment, or 
that it fosters the propensity to moral goodness in any direct fashion, 
fails in our eyes to agree with the content of much ancient and modern 
tragedy, and to encapsulate the content of tragic affirmation.2 
 The view that tragedy and morality constitute two fundamentally 
independent vectors owes much to Nietzsche, the central thrust of 
whose Die Geburt is to establish an opposition between the life-
affirmative Dionysian orientation of tragic culture, and the non-
Dionysian, rationalistic optimism of its Socratic successor, from which 
we have come to understand the experience of tragedy as a primitive and 
unmediated existential event, and to regard this privileged, pre-moral sta-
tus as the ground of its value. 
 In consequence Nietzsche has been invoked frequently, especially 
by writers influenced by post-structuralism, in support of the Platonic 
idea that a fundamental opposition subsists between the claims of tragic 
art and those of philosophy, with the crucial supplement that Nietzsche 
is held to show, contra Plato, that our judgement should not come down 
on the side of philosophy, and that the tragic poets should not be exiled 
but on the contrary prized for their exhibition of the limits of philosoph-
ical reason. 
 If this line of interpretation were correct, then it would be a mis-
take to look to Nietzsche for an internal theory of tragedy in the sense 
described above, since the whole point of his philosophical project 
would be to show how the perspective of tragedy undermines the aspira-
tion to systematic discursive conceptualisation. 
                                     
2 I offer a more detailed historical view in: Tragedy, morality and metaphysics, in: 
Art and Morality, J. L. Bermúdez/S. Gardner (eds.), London 2003, 218-259. 
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 I think, however, that this misunderstands Nietzsche’s complex 
position on the relation of tragic experience to discursive thought. Cer-
tainly Nietzsche accords priority to the experience of tragedy, which he 
regards as unanalysable beyond a certain point. Nietzsche insists on the 
limited discursive explicability of the life-affirmative dimension of trage-
dy and its Dionysian component,3 that is, the phenomenon that pain can 
be experienced as an occasion for joy, ‘jene Erscheinung, daß Schmerzen 
Lust erwecken’:4 the cheerfulness of the Greeks is ultimately inexplicable, 
an unerklärliche Heiterkeit.5 It is for this reason that tragic art has priority 
for Nietzsche over any corresponding theory or structure of thought  
the experience of tragedy is a condition on the communicability of tragic 
philosophy  and that tragedy is strictly impossible without the spirit of 
music.6  
 Nietzsche does not, however, suppose that the experience of tra-
gedy can dispense with reflective, theoretical articulation: the ‘aesthetic me-
taphysics’ or ‘artist’s metaphysics’7 contained in Die Geburt are not an ad-
dendum to the experience of tragedy but integral to it and a condition of 
its all-important existential meaning.8 Tragedy arose, on Nietzsche’s ac-
                                     
3 Cf. BT §2, 21; WKG III-1:30, BT §3, 22; WKG III-1:31, and BT §17, 81; WKG 
III-1:105-106. References prefixed ‘BT’ are to the English translation, The Birth 
of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music (1872), tr. S. Whiteside, M. Tanner (ed.), 
Harmondsworth 1993, and then, prefixed WKG (in the form, e.g., ‘III-1:3’, re-
ferring to Abteilung III, Band 1, and Seite 3) to Nietzsche, Werke: Kritische Ge-
samtausgabe, G. Colli/M. Montinari (eds.), Berlin 1967-. 
4 BT §2, 20; WKG III-1:29. 
5 BT §3, 22; WKG III-1:31. 
6 Cf. BT §2, 21; WKG III-1:30 and BT §17, 81; WKG III-1:105-106: ‘Of course 
we must reconstruct the overwhelming power of the musical effect [...] before 
we perceive anything of the incomparable consolation that must have been inhe-
rent in true tragedy [um etwas von jenem unvergleichlichen Troste zu empfan-
gen, der der wahren Tragödie zu eigen sein muß].’ 
7 In 1872 Nietzsche talks of ‘aesthetischen Metaphysik’, BT §5, 29; WKG III-1:39. 
The phrase ‘Artisten-Metaphysik’ is introduced only in the later prefatory ‘Ver-
such einer Selbstkritik’, BT, 5; WKG III-1:7. 
8 What follows is taken in part from ‘Nietzsche’s philosophical aestheticism’, in: 
Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, K. Gemes/J. Richardson (eds.), Oxford 2011, 
where the interpretation is presented and defended in more detail. 
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count, as a solution to an existential quandary: the Homeric Greeks 
found themselves unable to reject the Dionysian truth with which ‘bar-
baric’ Asiatic Dionysus-worship confronted them, but equally unable  
on account of their habituation to Apollonian reality and acute sensitivity 
 to tolerate the level of pain which embracing Dionysus demands. Tra-
gedy, according to Nietzsche, resolved this predicament by allowing 
Dionysian truth to be conjoined with Apollonian illusion. In this process 
the artist’s metaphysics of Die Geburt play a logically essential role. 
Nietzsche proposes that the Nature or primal Oneness, ‘Ur-Eine’, which 
lies at the ground of Dionysian experience has its own, supra-personal 
telos,9 which realises itself though human subjects, at two levels: first, in 
the ‘symbolic expression’ which it receives in Dionysian cult festivals and 
their musical forms,10 and then, more profoundly, in tragic representa-
tion, through which the Ur-Eine receives ‘its constant redemption’, 
‘seiner steten Erlösung’.11 This simple and brilliant move  supplying the 
Apollonian with a Dionysian ground, which it lacked previously in Ho-
meric culture, and the Dionysian with an Apollonian telos, which it 
lacked previously in Asiatic culture  Nietzsche validates the Apollonian 
representation of life, which Dionysian experience seemed to endanger, 
on grounds independent of truth. Indeed, it is precisely because of the 
epistemically negative character of the Apollonian, the fact that it is ‘illu-
sion of illusion’, ‘Schein des Scheins’, that it can play its necessary metaphysi-
cal role: by means of tragedy’s Apollonian symbolic representation of 
                                                                                                                  
9 Cf. the end of BT §1, 18; WKG III-1:26 (‘the artistic power of the whole of na-
ture [die Kunstgewalt der ganzen Natur]’, ‘of the Dionysian world-artist [des 
dionysischen Weltenkünstlers]’) and the beginning of §2, 18; WKG III-1:26 (the 
Apollonian and Dionysian are ‘artistic powers which spring from nature itself, 
without the mediation of the human artist [ohne Vermittelung des menschlichen 
Künstlers], and in which nature’s artistic urges are immediately and directly satis-
fied’). The metaphysical character of the assumption is made explicit in §4, 25; 
WKG III-1:34-35. 
10 Cf. BT §2, 20-21; WKG III-1:29-30. 
11 BT §4, 25; WKG III-1:34. 
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Dionysian reality, the Ur-Eine finds, Nietzsche says, satisfaction of its 
primal desire for illusion, an even higher satisfaction  ‘eine noch höhere 
Befriedigung der Urbegierde nach dem Schein’  than that provided by 
empirical reality.12 
 From this it is clear that Nietzsche’s story of the Ur-Eine’s re-
demption-in-illusion cannot belong only to the external, philosophical 
interpretation of tragedy, but must form a constitutive part of the expe-
rience of tragedy itself: Nietzsche must suppose the Greeks themselves 
to have grasped the metaphysical conception in at least an implicit form, 
for otherwise tragedy would not have allowed them to regard Apollo and 
Dionysus as reconciled. In any case, and even more importantly  in 
view of the fact that the final aim of Die Geburt is not to explain a Greek 
cultural development, but to establish tragedy in place of Schopenhaue-
rian pessimism in modern consciousness13  the artist-metaphysical con-
ception is necessary for tragedy to be re-embraced in the present day: 
Nietzsche offers the vision of the Ur-Eine to his readers as an account 
of what is involved in tragic consciousness, and as an invitation to grasp 
the world in its light. 
 While it is true that a sizeable portion of modified Schopenhaue-
rian metaphysics is presupposed, in some sense of the term, in Die Ge-
burt, and Nietzsche no doubt intends his story of the Ur-Eine to bring to 
mind the rich history of metaphysical proposals in aesthetically-
orientated Romantic post-Kantian philosophy, it does not follow that 
Nietzsche understands the metaphysical propositions in question in the 
same terms as his post-Kantian predecessors.14 The right view of this 
much-discussed issue is to be gleaned from the passage in §4 of Die Ge-
                                     
12 BT §4, 25; WKG III-1:35. 
13 Which Nietzsche is pursuing by means of an analogy of our cultural situation 
with that of Greek Apollonian culture in its encounter with Dionysian truth: we 
too are caught in an acute contradiction of theoretical with practical reason, of 
truth with the conditions of life. 
14 The reading of Die Geburt as advancing metaphysical or ‘ontological’ truth, 
prominent in Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation, is widespread. 
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burt where Nietzsche sets out the grounds for our acceptance of his art-
ist’s metaphysics in carefully chosen words. In what reads like a rehear-
sal, with appropriate substitution of terms, of Kant’s moral argument for 
the theological postulates, Nietzsche argues in explicitly first-personal 
terms from the felt longing, ‘Sehnsucht’, for redemption by illusion, 
‘Erlöstwerden durch den Schein’, not to the truth of Schopenhauer’s me-
taphysics, but to feeling himself compelled to make the metaphysical assump-
tion, ‘metaphysischen Annahme’, of a primal Oneness that ‘needs’ the 
Apollonian vision.15 What Nietzsche advances, therefore, is a practically 
grounded argument, which delivers only a necessity of representation, not me-
taphysical truth.16 Our difference from the Greeks is that we know that 
that which must be postulated as a condition of the fulfilment of our 
axiological-practical needs cannot be taken in an unreservedly realistic 
spirit: it can have only the status of, in Kantian language, an ‘object of 
practical cognition’. 
 Nietzsche’s non-realist stance towards his artist’s metaphysics is 
connected with his view of the inexplicability of tragedy. Were 
Nietzsche’s understanding of his metaphysics the same as Schopenhau-
er’s, then the discursive representation of the experience of tragedy by 
means of Nietzsche’s artist’s metaphysics ought on the face of it to be 
regarded as making that experience rationally transparent, in the manner of 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysical explications of art  just as Schopenhau-
er’s account of tragedy as showing the self-antagonism of the will makes 
the meaning of tragedy rationally accessible.17 If that were so, then trage-
dy would give Nietzsche an argument for life-affirmation, in the same 
sense that Schopenhauer thinks it argues for resignation. The discursive 
articulations of the Dionysian-tragic experience that Nietzsche offers in 
                                     
15 BT §4, 25; WKG III-1:34-35. 
16 A full account would require reference to the Nachlaß material from 1872-1873 
regarding Nietzsche’s relation to Kant, and to the influence of Alfred Lange.  
17 A., The World as Will and Representation, tr. E. F. J. Payne, New York 1969, 
vol. 1, §51, 252-254; Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Bd. 1, in Sämtliche 
Werke, W. Frhr. von Löhneysen (Hg.), Stuttgart 1960, Bd. 2, 353-356. 
 43
Die Geburt are, however, certainly not intended to account for the life-
affirmative upshot of tragedy: the claim that Dionysian subjects cognise 
their noumenal identity with fecund self-delighting nature is not meant 
to explain the phenomenon that pain is experienced with joy. 
 Nietzsche elaborates his non-realist understanding of his artist’s 
metaphysics in §9 of Die Geburt, where he discusses the moral metaphys-
ics of Aeschylus and Sophocles, that is, the views implied by their works 
of the relation of human action to cosmic justice. Sophocles is said to 
conceive Oedipus as the ‘noble man’ whose actions destroy the whole 
moral world yet which exert ‘a magical and beneficial power’ which 
founds ‘a new world on the ruins of the old’. Nietzsche then explains 
that ‘[t]his is what the poet, in so far as he is also a religious thinker, wishes to 
say to us’,18 and, crucially, that the whole vision of the poet, ‘die ganze 
Auffassung des Dichters’, is nothing but ‘that light-image that healing 
nature holds up to us after we have glimpsed the abyss’, ‘jenes Lichtbild, 
welches uns, nach einem Blick in den Abgrund, die heilende Natur 
vorhält’: ‘light-patches, we might say, to heal the gaze seared by the terri-
ble night’, ‘leuchtende Flecken zur Heilung des von grausiger Nacht ver-
sehrten Blickes’.19 The particularised vision of the poet Sophocles does 
not, however, Nietzsche says, exhaust the content of the tragic myth of 
Oedipus: its full content, he claims, concerns the Schopenhauerian ‘dis-
solution of nature’ into a trans-phenomenal will.20 
 In similar fashion, Aeschylus’ Prometheus  which, Nietzsche ac-
knowledges, reflects Aeschylus’ ‘longing for justice’, rests on an ‘unshake-
able substratum of [Greek] metaphysical thought’, and provides an ‘ethi-
cal background to pessimistic tragedy and the justification of human 
evil’21  is interpreted in terms of the complex meaning carried by indi-
viduation according to Nietzsche’s artist’s metaphysics. 
                                     
18 BT §9, 46; WKG III-1:61-62. Italics added. 
19 BT §9, 47; WKG III-1:63 and BT §9, 46; WKG III-1:61.  
20 BT §9, 47; WKG III-1:63. 
21 BT §9, 48-50; WKG II-1:63-66. 
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 The moral metaphysics of Sophocles and Aeschylus are thus re-
garded by Nietzsche as derived logically, through the interpolation of 
extraneous religious and ethical elements and the mediation of the art-
ist’s individual personality, from Nietzsche’s artist’s metaphysics. What 
Nietzsche intends his artist’s metaphysics to amount to, therefore, is not 
an extraction of metaphysical truth from tragic myth, but a restatement of tragic 
myth in its highest, most comprehensive, maximally universal (and in that 
sense ‘philosophical’) form, one that allows all particular tragic myths (of 
Oedipus, Prometheus, etc.) to be seen as instances of a single schema, 
variations on a theme, or partial realisations of an archetype; and since 
the latter are ultimately just Lichtbilder, so too must be Nietzsche’s revised 
Schopenhauerian metaphysics. Nietzsche is, therefore, regarding Scho-
penhauer’s metaphysics as myth suitable for modernity  as a mythic content 
which we moderns will find it intelligible to postulate, and which may 
serve for us as a discursive reflection of the experiential meaning of tra-
gedy, related to that experience in a quasi-metaphorical but non-arbitrary 
way. In summary, then, the artist’s metaphysics are conceptual after-
images of the experience of tragedy, capable of playing a logical role as 
postulates answering to the subject’s concern to articulate reflectively the 
experience of tragedy. 
 Nietzsche’s position on the possibility of an internal theory of tra-
gedy is therefore intricate, and the conditions for an adequate theory of 
tragedy, it is implied in Die Geburt, are difficult to meet. To summarise 
these: On Nietzsche’s account an adequate theory of tragedy must give 
central place to the affirmative moment in tragic experience, for it is this 
that gives tragedy its true, anti-Schopenhauerian value. This affirmative 
moment cannot, Nietzsche thinks, be explained by direct reference to 
metaphysical reality, but it involves nonetheless a conceptualisation, 
which it is the task of a theory of tragedy to articulate. Though meta-
physical truth cannot be claimed for this conceptualisation, it does have 
a different kind of validity, deriving from its reciprocal relation to the 
experience of tragedy, which gives it authority and which it supplies with 
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a warrant in the eyes of the subject of tragic experience. In Die Geburt 
Nietzsche employs Schopenhauer’s metaphysics as materials for con-
structing his version of this conception, and Kant’s notion of practical 
cognition as a model for its validation. 
 Many elements in Die Geburt are carried over into Nietzsche’s later 
thinking, but in one crucial respect, the position he advances in 1872 is 
left behind for good: Nietzsche re-assesses the capacity of contemporary 
modernity for regeneration through direct artistic means and ceases to 
hold out any hope that the experience of (Wagner’s) tragic art will arrest 
the slide into nihilism. The next port of call in Nietzsche’s development, 
evidenced in Morgenröthe and Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, is instead 
science, more exactly, the virtues and sensibility of modern scientific 
consciousness, which aesthetic consciousness, Nietzsche observes, fails 
to incorporate and is at odds with. This signals Nietzsche’s clear-sighted 
recognition that the Lichtbilder-postulates of tragedy cannot hold their 
own against the demands of modern reflection, with its passionate 
commitment to the autonomy of theoretical reason  what Nietzsche 
later calls the will to truth  and largely naturalistic conception of its de-
liverances. Nietzsche’s subsequent strategy, in his so-called positivist pe-
riod, is accordingly to attempt to exploit precisely this modern commit-
ment as an instrument for critique and transformation. When at a later 
point Nietzsche returns to art and the aesthetic as a basis for existential 
progress  most explicitly in Book II of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft and the 
late Nachlaß  the idea of tragic experience is resumed under the head-
ing of what he calls der ästhetische Zustand, the aesthetic state of the sub-
ject.22 Nietzsche emphasises the light conceptual freight of the aesthetic 
state, but continues to attach to it an ideational component, which is 
now supplied by Nietzsche’s vision of the world as Will to Power and 
                                     
22 Cf., e.g., the passage headed ‘Aesthetica’ in the Nachlaß for autumn 1887, VIII-
2:57; Writings from the Late Notebooks, R. Bittner (ed.), Cambridge 2003, no. 
9[102], 159-160. 
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subject to eternal recurrence.23 The exact relation of these doctrines to 
the experience of tragedy is hard to determine, not least because of the 
uncertain epistemological and metaphysical status of Will to Power and 
eternal recurrence, but all that needs to be noted for present purposes is 
that, unless Will to Power and eternal recurrence have independent au-
thority in the eyes of theoretical reason, it is hard to see how the situa-
tion has changed structurally since Die Geburt: on the face of it, 
Nietzsche has merely substituted a different Lichtbild for the fictive me-
taphysics of the Ur-Eine. The problem remains unsolved: if reflective ar-
ticulation of the experience of tragedy issues in a conception that we 
cannot accept as true, then Nietzsche has not given an account of the 
grounds on which, from outside the aesthetic state, we can regard it as 
rightful. And if this is so, then it must be concluded that, for all of 
Nietzsche’s acknowledgement of the demands of reflection and intense, 
life-long preoccupation with the relation of art and truth, no stable posi-
tion on the relation of tragic experience to the demands of reflection can 
be found in either Die Geburt or Nietzsche’s later writings.24 
 
3. If Nietzsche’s surrogate for metaphysical truth does not satisfy de-
mands of reflection which, Nietzsche himself acknowledges, cannot be 
escaped, while the earlier tradition of theorising about tragedy fails 
Nietzsche’s litmus test of rationalising the affirmative dimension of tra-
gedy in an appropriately immediate, non-moral way, then we must look 
elsewhere. I will turn now to another historical figure. Sartre is not re-
ferred to often in the context of the theory of tragedy, but his claim to 
provide an adequate internal theory of tragedy is, I will suggest, very 
                                     
23 Cf. in particular the 1885 Nachlaß, VII-3:338-339; The Will to Power, tr. W. 
Kaufmann/R. J. Hollingdale, W. Kaufmann (ed.), (New York: Vintage Books, 
1968), no. 1067, 549-550. 
24 For a fuller defence of this admittedly large claim, cf. ‘Nietzsche’s philosophical 
aestheticism’, where I argue that it is doubtful that the aesthetic state can play its 
internal role in Nietzsche’s project, namely as breaking the deadlock of theoreti-
cal and practical reason. 
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strong. Again for reasons of space my comments will need to be very 
compressed. 
 The term tragedy figures little in Sartre’s texts, and nowhere, to the 
best of my knowledge, does Sartre discuss tragic works of art under that 
description. It is nevertheless a commonplace to describe the view of the 
human condition presented in Sartre’s philosophy and literary works as 
tragic, and with good reason, for Sartre presents man as bound in the 
strongest sense to strive for an end which is in principle incapable of ful-
filment. More exactly and more strongly, according to Sartre’s ontology, 
man is that striving  a ‘passion inutile’.25  
 Abstracting from all questions regarding the coherence of Sartre’s 
metaphysics, the point which is important for present purposes is the 
strength prima facie of Sartre’s candidacy for an adequate internal theory 
of tragedy: Sartre identifies the structure of human subjectivity with trag-
ic form, and grounds this identification in a comprehensive metaphysical 
system. The point can be brought out by a contrast with the post-
Kantian, pre-Hegelian German idealist metaphysics which Sartre’s sys-
tem in many ways resembles. The notion that the human subject is 
bound to aim at a metaphysically-defined end which it cannot realise  
because its realisation would be inconsistent with the finitude which de-
fines human, as opposed to divine, subjectivity  appears in Fichte, early 
Schelling, and much writing of the Frühromantik.26 Sartre’s difference 
from these early post-Kantian authors is that, on his account, not even 
an infinite approximation, unendliche Annäherung, is possible  on the con-
trary, on Sartre’s account the end constitutive of human subjectivity, viz., 
attaining the status of en-soi-pour-soi, recedes with every step that we might 
                                     
25 Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, tr. Hazel E. 
Barnes, London 1995, 615; L’Être et le néant. Essai d’ontologie phénoménolo-
gique, Paris 1943, 708. 
26 The theme is highlighted and explored by M. Frank in: Unendliche Annäherung. 
Die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik, Frankfurt 1997, partially tran-
slated as The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, tr. E. 
Millan-Zaibert, Albany 2004. 
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seem to take towards it. Our distance from it cannot be diminished, 
since in reality nothing could count as Annäherung to the condition of a 
causa sui. This is what makes Sartre’s metaphysics tragic in a sense which 
is not true of, for example, to take the least tragedy-orientated of the 
post-Kantians, Fichte. On Fichte’s account, the end of man, man’s Bes-
timmung, is, properly speaking, not to realise the unachievable end of an 
Aufhebung of the distinction of Ich from Nicht-Ich, but to approximate to 
that condition, and this approximation is something which is achievable, 
through internalisation of the Aufhebung as a regulative ideal and the 
moral commitment which follows from it.27 On Sartre’s account, by con-
trast, the teleology which defines human subjectivity is abortive in its en-
tirety and without qualification, from start to finish. 
 In light of the absolute centrality of man’s metaphysical failure for 
Sartre, and the absence from Sartre of any tendency to subordinate his 
view of the human condition to the perspective of morality, Sartre’s 
claim to have articulated an internal theory of tragedy would appear, so 
far, exceptionally strong. The difficulty comes, however, when we turn 
to consider what Sartre has to say about the affirmative component of 
the experience of tragedy. 
 There can be no doubt that Sartre regards the picture of human ex-
istence in Being and Nothingness as a spur to action, and that the intended 
effect of his philosophical work is to induce not despair but an intensifi-
cation of our engagement with the world, based on a new insight into 
our metaphysical plight. But how, it may be asked, can Sartre hope to 
achieve the opposite of Schopenhauerian resignation, given that, on his 
account, it is impossible for us to realise our constitutive telos? 
 There is, of course, another part to Sartre’s story: insight into 
man’s ‘original project of being’, projet originel d’être,28 gives rise to the pos-
                                     
27 The different relation of Schelling and Frühromantik to tragedy I will come back 
to in my conclusion. 
28 Being and Nothingness, 564-665, L’Être et le néant, 651-652. 
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sibility of what Sartre calls ‘pure reflection’ and ‘radical conversion’,29 
which in turn makes possible an affirmation of freedom, freedom which 
takes itself as a value or end, which wills and affirms and is conscious of 
itself, and carries ethical potential.30 So, it may be suggested, the affirma-
tive moment in tragedy maps onto this part of Sartre’s account: the pri-
mary, negative, purgative moment of the tragic development, constituted 
by the failure of man’s projet d’être, engenders a prise de conscience which 
opens up horizons of affirmation. 
 Further reflection shows, however, that this cannot be right, or at 
the very least, that the identification of tragic affirmation with the self-
affirmation of Sartrean freedom requires careful handling of the latter 
notion. If the affirmation of freedom involves a genuine metamorphosis 
in the subject’s orientation, then it allows itself to be characterised, it 
would seem, as man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity: the 
subject takes possession of itself, and in finally assuming self-
responsibility, makes a fresh beginning. Sartre’s outlook would then lose 
its tragic character: the metaphysics of abortive teleology would describe 
only the immature condition of man ignorant of his true potential for au-
tonomy, and the unrealisable telos of becoming en-soi-pour-soi would be 
discarded once and for all, replaced outright by the new, realisable telos 
of freedom’s self-affirmation. Sartre’s outlook would thus converge with 
Fichte’s view of man’s Bestimmung, and we would back to a familiar, 
optimistic, Enlightenment outlook, advancing towards the kingdom of 
ends. 
 Though Sartre’s position does allow itself to be recast in this or-
thodox Enlightenment form,31 and Sartre talks on occasion  in, for ex-
ample, the famous L’Existentialisme est un humanisme lecture  as if he 
wishes his existentialism to be classified alongside classical humanist po-
                                     
29 Being and Nothingness, 464, 475-476, L’Être et le néant, 542, 554-555. 
30 Being and Nothingness, 627-628, L’Être et le néant, 722. 
31 This is the tendency of Simone de Beauvoir’s Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, 
Paris 1947; The Ethics of Ambiguity, tr. B. Frechtman, New York 1996. 
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sitions, competing with Kant and Marx in the market-place of humanist 
ideologies, I do not think that it represents Sartre’s true outlook. The key 
issue is whether the new aim of affirming freedom supplants and oblite-
rates the original abortive teleology of the subject  meaning that the 
subject’s telos has undergone an objective transformation  or whether 
the aim of freedom remains dependent and merely overlaid on the abor-
tive teleology. If the latter is the case, and if it is held that the aim of af-
firming freedom continues to get its sense from its negative relation to 
our abortive teleology, the purposiveness and value of the aim of free-
dom consisting in a double negation  repudiation of the futility of the 
projet originel d’être  rather than comprising a self-standing, uncondi-
tioned good, then we have a tragic rather than Enlightenment structure. 
Aiming at freedom would, in that case, be merely the most that we can 
do to compensate for our abiding tragic fate, consciousness of which 
would never be shaken off, since it would supply the motivational 
ground for our affirmation of freedom. 
 That Sartre sides with tragedy rather than Enlightenment self-
assurance becomes clear in the following passage from ‘Qu’est-ce que la 
littérature?’. Sartre is describing, and commending, an outlook that he 
discovers in modern poetry: 
 
‘One does not ordinarily consider the two faces of Janus; the man of ac-
tion sees one and the poet sees the other. When the instruments are bro-
ken and unusable, when plans are blasted and effort is useless, the world 
appears with a childlike and terrible freshness, without supports, without 
paths. It has the maximum reality because it is crushing for man, and as 
action, in any case, generalizes, defeat restores to things their individual 
reality. But, by an expected reversal, the defeat, considered as a final end, 
is at once a contesting and an appropriation [à la fois contestation et ap-
propriation] of this universe. A contesting, because man is worth more 
[vaut mieux] than that which crushes him; he no longer contests things in 
their ‘little bit of reality’ [leur ‘peu de réalité’], like the engineer or the 
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captain, but, on the contrary, in their ‘too full of reality’ [leur ‘trop plein 
de réalité’], by his very existence as a vanquished person; he is the re-
morse of the world. An appropriation, because the world, by ceasing to 
be the tool of success, becomes the instrument of failure. So there it is, 
traversed by an obscure finality; it is its coefficient of adversity which 
serves, the more human in so far as it is more hostile to man. The defeat 
turns itself into salvation [L’échec lui-même se retourne en salut]. Not 
that it makes us yield to some beyond [quelque au-delà], but by itself it 
shifts and is metamorphosed. For example, poetic language arises out of 
the ruins of prose [...] 
 Poetry is a case of the loser winning [La poésie, c’est qui perd 
gagne]. And the authentic poet chooses to lose, even if he has to go so 
far as to die, in order to win [...] he is the man who commits himself to 
lose [...] it is his deepest choice, the source and not the consequence of 
his poetry. He is certain of the total defeat of the human enterprise and 
arranges to fail in his own life in order to bear witness, by his individual 
defeat, to human defeat in general.’32 
 
The challenge of modern poetry, Sartre says, is pursued in the name of 
‘the hidden defeat which every victory conceals’, but the perspective 
which it expresses is ‘the absolute valorisation of the defeat [la valorisa-
tion absolue de l’échec]’.33 The passage thus evokes strikingly the affir-
mative pathos of tragedy so important for Nietzsche  the sense in 
which tragedy is felt to display human life, in the instant of its failure, as 
achieving a unique value and dignity, as unconditionally to-be-embraced, 
in its curious interdependence with a recognition that the ‘human enter-
prise’ ends in ‘total defeat’. 
                                     
32 What is Literature?, tr. Bernard Frechtman, London 1967, 23-24 n4; Qu’est-ce 
que la littérature?, in: Situations II, Paris 1948, 86-87 n4. (Translation slightly 
modified.) 
33 What is Literature?, 24-25 n4; Qu’est-ce que la litérature?, 87 n4. 
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 Though Sartre does not avow the outlook described in the passage 
as his own, his sympathy is clear  contemporary poetry which valorises 
defeat is in possession of existential truth. Indeed, the qui perd gagne for-
mula can be regarded as setting the pattern of Sartre’s metaphysics: onto-
logically, the human subject is absolute defeat  sheer lack of being, 
manque d’être  but is able to turn its condition of deprivation against be-
ing and convert its existence as néant into a kind of victory. The tragic 
perspective Sartre discerns in modern poetry thus transfers itself to his 
own outlook. 
 We know why the human enterprise, on Sartre’s account, must end 
in defeat; but it remains to be considered how the philosophical base of 
Sartre’s account of tragic affirmation should be construed, given that, as 
we have seen, it cannot consist in grasping that we should aim at free-
dom (even if it may presuppose or imply that reorientation). What dis-
tinguishes ‘absolute valorisation’ of defeat from mere consciousness of 
defeat? Sartre’s answer is that the valorisation comprises ‘a contesting 
and an appropriation of this universe’. This may be understood in two 
ways, subjectively or objectively. On the one hand, we might read the 
contesting and appropriation described by Sartre as referring only to an 
attitude which the defeated human subject may (should) take up towards 
the world  a stance or way of thinking about the world which Sartre is 
recommending, or which, he is claiming, the unobscured apprehension 
of our total defeat entitles us to adopt. Alternatively, the contesting and 
appropriation might be read as having the same reality-status and objec-
tive truth as the original upsurge of the pour-soi and failure of its projet 
d’être  that is, as an event which belongs to the fabric of reality, not 
merely our attitude towards it. 
 Sartre’s text is, characteristically, poised between the two interpre-
tations; the statement that man ‘is worth more’ than the world that crushes 
him appears categorical and unconditional, yet may also be taken, in con-
text, as referring only to how the poet chooses to represent humanity. 
The problem, in any case, is that neither construal seems satisfactory, in 
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so far as Sartre’s position is considered in the light of what is required 
for an adequate internal theory of tragedy. If the valorisation of defeat is 
a purely subjective matter, then it is not true that man’s defeat has positive 
value in the same sense as it is true that it has negative value: the two mo-
ments of tragedy, the negative and the affirmative, weigh unequally, the 
former being grounded in reality, the latter being a matter of mere, un-
grounded, subjective decision. However successful Sartre, or modern 
poets, may be in inducing us to feel tragic defeat as if it were an instance 
of victory, tragic affirmation would then not survive reflective scrutiny, 
and Sartre’s position would confront the same difficulties as Nietzsche’s 
metaphysical postulates. 
 The objective reading, while circumventing this problem, encoun-
ters its opposite: the affirmative moment weighs too heavily. If the sub-
jective attitude of valorisation of defeat is grounded on the fact of its ab-
solute value  if it is objectively true that, through man’s defeat, the 
world accedes to man’s reproach and alters its teleological shape  then 
defeat does indeed ‘turn itself into salvation’, but in so strong a sense 
that the negative moment of tragedy is cancelled: if our defeat enables 
our absolute victory, then loss becomes a strategy, and exists only in ap-
pearance. The pattern of Kant’s sublime and Schiller’s interpretation of 
tragedy is thus reproduced, albeit in a de-moralised form: Zweckwidrigkeit 
reveals itself as Zweckmäßigkeit. 
 Sartre, it may be noted, is acutely aware of the possibility and dan-
ger that tragic fate will be transmuted into Providence and tragic affirma-
tion into Divine Grace, and repudiates explicitly the attempt to extract 
transcendent metaphysical meaning (‘some beyond’, as he puts it in the 
passage) from the formula of qui perd gagne.34 In Search for a Method Sartre 
castigates Jaspers for manifesting ‘a surreptitious wish to resuscitate the 
transcendent’. Jaspers, according to Sartre, takes from Kierkegaard the 
                                     
34 C. Howells, Sartre and negative theology, in: Modern Languages Review 76, 
1981, 549-555, puts in focus the problematic relation between Sartre’s idea of 
‘salvation’ and his opposition to the theologisation of defeat. 
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idea of a subjectivity which ‘discovers the transcendent through its de-
feats’, allowing us to ‘catch a presentiment of the transcendent in our 
failures’ as their ‘profound meaning’, and from this ‘subjective pessim-
ism’ derives a ‘theological optimism’ which ‘dare not speak its name’: the 
transcendent proves its reality through its absence. This feeble and trea-
cherous conception, ‘cette pensée molle et sournoise’, Sartre concludes, 
is ‘perfectly suited to a bourgeoisie which is partially de-Christianized but 
which regrets its past faith’: it is ‘only a survival’ and holds no philosoph-
ical interest.35 
 Sartre cannot be suspected of the covert Christian motivation he 
attributes to Jaspers, but the problem remains for Sartre’s account: the 
form of qui perd gagne is teleological, and even if Sartre’s philosophical 
system prevents the ground of tragic affirmation from being given de-
terminate theistic form, it remains the case that, when tragic affirmation 
is allowed an objective ground, the world assumes a positive teleological 
character, which remains stubbornly providential, and thus non-tragic. 
Thus, while all credit is due to Sartre for grasping the nettle and asserting 
the paradoxical absolute-value-in-absolute-defeat which is the essence of 
tragic experience, it cannot be claimed that Sartre allows us to compre-
hend this axiological paradox in systematic, discursive, philosophical 
terms. Sartre’s tragic insight is here one step ahead of his metaphysics. 
 
4. We have, therefore, moved in a circle. At the final hurdle, Sartre either 
reproduces Nietzsche’s aporia, the failure to provide a reflective expres-
sion of the experience of tragedy which satisfies the demands of our 
theoretical reason, or displays the characteristic limitation of traditional, 
pre-Nietzschean theories of tragedy, the conversion of tragedy into a 
species of oblique providence. Nietzsche appears vindicated, with re-
                                     
35 Search for a Method, tr. H. E. Barnes, New York 1968, 15-16; Critique de la rai-
son dialectique (précedé de Question de méthode), tome 1, Théorie des en-
sembles pratiques, Paris 1960, 21-22. 
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spect to his thesis of the incompatibility of tragic consciousness with So-
cratic rationalism. 
 We can now state in a general form the reason for thinking that no 
internal theory of tragedy can succeed. Tragedy requires a teleological 
consideration of human existence, and that this teleology have an ulti-
mately negative character. This is something that philosophy can pro-
vide, as the metaphysics of Sartre (and of course Schopenhauer) make 
clear. But a theory of tragedy must also, as Nietzsche rightly insists, ra-
tionalise the affirmative moment in tragedy, and do so in the right way. 
And it is at this point that the movement of thought leading from the 
aesthetic experience of tragic works to a philosophical conception of the 
meaning of tragedy miscarries: philosophical theory either leaves the af-
firmative moment ungrounded, a mere subjective attitude lacking reflec-
tive endorsement, or it supplies it with a ground, which satisfies the de-
mands of reflection, but at the same time cannot avoid cancelling the 
fact of tragedy, even when theism is rejected explicitly and the nature of 
the ground is left indeterminate. Nietzsche’s Lichtbilder-postulates and 
ästhetischer Zustand illustrate the first disjunct, as does Sartre on the sub-
jectivist reading; Jaspers, and Sartre on the objectivist reading, illustrate 
the second. 
 The challenge is to decide where we should go from here. If we do 
not call a halt with Walpole’s dichotomy of the-world-as-thought and 
the-world-as felt  leaving the worlds of the happy man and the unhap-
py man distinct and unreconciled  then, as far as I can see, only one 
possibility remains. The underlying reason for the difficulty we have en-
countered is the unqualified absoluteness of tragic experience, which makes 
the articulation of an internal theory of tragedy an all-or-nothing matter. 
If this assumption could be relaxed, then some accommodation between the 
demands of reflection and the experience of tragedy could be sought. If 
this route is worth pursuing, then the appropriate place to look is to 
Schelling, Hölderlin and the early German Romantics, whose thought in-
corporates tragic elements in a way that Fichte’s does not, but for whom 
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tragic experience is not final, or unconditionally authoritative, in the way 
that it is for Nietzsche: tragedy is interpreted, instead, as expressing an 
insight to be assimilated and a challenge to be overcome.36 We might 
consider furthermore that the systematic difficulty we have discovered in 
the construction of an internal theory of tragedy supports such an ap-
proach: if the negative and affirmative moments in tragedy cannot be 
coordinated in reflection, then, it may be argued, this reflects not a limi-
tation of reflection but the fact that the experience of tragedy is not fully 
coherent, and if that is so, then its claim to absoluteness should not be 
taken at face value. Whether this accommodation can be carried off, 
without either revoking the negative moment in tragedy or undermining 
its Dionysian affirmative moment, is another question.
                                     
36 Emphasised by K. Ameriks in ‘Tragedy, romanticism, and idealism’ (forthcom-
ing), from which I have profited in writing this paper. 
